Explainable Automated Reasoning in Law using Probabilistic Epistemic
  Argumentation by Ibs, Inga & Potyka, Nico
Explainable Automated Reasoning in Law using Probabilistic Epistemic
Argumentation
Inga Ibs1 , Nico Potyka2
1Technical University of Darmstadt
2University of Stuttgart
inga.ibs@tu-darmstadt.de, nico.potyka@ipvs.uni-stuttgart.de
Abstract
Applying automated reasoning tools for decision support and
analysis in law has the potential to make court decisions more
transparent and objective. Since there is often uncertainty
about the accuracy and relevance of evidence, non-classical
reasoning approaches are required. Here, we investigate
probabilistic epistemic argumentation as a tool for automated
reasoning about legal cases. We introduce a general scheme
to model legal cases as probabilistic epistemic argumentation
problems, explain how evidence can be modeled and sketch
how explanations for legal decisions can be generated auto-
matically. Our framework is easily interpretable, can deal
with cyclic structures and imprecise probabilities and guar-
antees polynomial-time probabilistic reasoning in the worst-
case.
1 Introduction
Legal reasoning problems can be addressed from differ-
ent perspectives. From a lawyer’s perspective, a trial may
be best modeled as a strategic game. In a criminal trial,
for example, the prosecutor may try to convince the judge
or jury of the defendant’s guilt while the defense attorney
tries the opposite. The problem is then to interpret the law
and the evidence in a way that maximizes the agent’s util-
ity. From this perspective, a legal reasoning problem is
best modeled using tools from decision and game theory
(Hanson, Hanson, and Hart 2014; Prakken and Sartor 1996;
Riveret et al. 2007).
Our focus here is not on strategic considerations, but on
the decision process that leads to the final verdict in a le-
gal process like a trial. Given different pieces of evidence
and beliefs about their authenticity and relevance, how can
we merge them to make a plausible and transparent deci-
sion? Different automated reasoning tools have been ap-
plied in order to answer similar questions, for example, case-
based reasoning (Bench-Capon and Sartor 2003; McCarty
1995), argumentation frameworks (Dung and Thang 2010;
Prakken et al. 2013) or Bayesian networks (Fenton, Neil,
and Lagnado 2013). Since lawyers and judges often struggle
with the interpretation of Bayesian networks, recent work
also tries to explain Bayesian networks by argumentation
tools (Vlek et al. 2016).
Here, we investigate the applicability of the probabilistic
epistemic argumentation framework developed in (Hunter
2013; Hunter, Polberg, and Thimm 2018; Hunter and
Thimm 2016; Thimm 2012). As opposed to classical ar-
gumentation approaches, this framework allows expressing
uncertainty by means of probability theory. In particular,
we can compute reasoning results in polynomial time when
we restrict the language (Potyka 2019). As it turns out, the
resulting fragment is sufficiently expressive for our purpose,
so that our framework is computationally more efficient than
many other probabilistic reasoning approaches that suffer
from exponential runtime in the worst-case. At the same
time, the graphical structure is easily interpretable and al-
lows to automatically generate explanations for the final de-
grees of belief (probabilities) as we will explain later.
While we can incorporate objective probabilities in our
framework, our probabilistic reasoning is best described as
subjective in the sense that we basically merge beliefs about
pieces of evidence and hypotheses (probabilities that can be
either objective or subjective). In order to define the beliefs
about pieces of evidence from objective evidence and statis-
tical information, another approach like Bayesian networks
or more general tools from probability theory may be better
suited. Our framework can then be applied on top of these
tools. In this sense, our framework can be seen as a comple-
ment rather than a replacement of alternative approaches.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion 2 explains the necessary basics. We will introduce a
basic legal argumentation framework in Section 3 and dis-
cuss more sophisticated building blocks in Section 4. We
will discuss and illustrate the explainability capabilities of
our approach as we proceed, but explain some more general
ideas in Section 5. Finally, we add some discussion about
related work, the pros and cons of our framework and future
work in Sections 6 and 7.
2 Probabilistic Epistemic Argumentation
Basics
Our legal reasoning approach builds up on the probabilis-
tic epistemic argumentation approach developed in (Thimm
2012; Hunter 2013; Hunter and Thimm 2016; Hunter, Pol-
berg, and Thimm 2018). In this approach, we assign de-
grees of belief in the form of probabilities to arguments us-
ing probability functions over possible worlds. A possible
world basically interprets every argument as either accepted
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or rejected. In order to restrict to probability functions that
respect prior beliefs and the structure of the argumentation
graph, different constraints can be defined. Afterwards, we
can assign a probability interval to every argument based on
these constraints. We will restrict to a fragment of the con-
straint language here that allows polynomial-time computa-
tions (Potyka 2019).
Formally, we represent arguments and their relationships
in a directed edge-weighted graph (A, E ,w). A is a finite
set of arguments, E ⊆ A×A is a finite set of directed edges
between the arguments and w : E → Q assigns a rational
number to every edge. If there is an edge (A,B) ∈ E , we
say that A attacks B if w((A,B)) < 0 and A supports B
if w((A,B)) > 0. We let Att(A) = {B ∈ A | (B,A) ∈
E , w((A,B)) < 0} be the set of attackers of an argument A
and Sup(A) = {B ∈ A | (B,A) ∈ E , w((A,B)) > 0} be
the set of supporters.
A possible world is a subset of arguments ω ⊆ A. In-
tuitively, ω contains the arguments that are accepted in a
particular state of the world. Beliefs about the true state of
the world are modeled by rational-valued probability func-
tions P : 2A → [0, 1] ∩ Q such that ∑ω∈2A P (ω) = 1.
The restriction to probabilities from the rational numbers is
for computational reasons only. In practice, it does not re-
ally mean any loss of generality because implementations
usually use finite precision arithmetic. We denote the set
of all probability functions over A by PA. The probability
of an argument A ∈ A under P is defined by adding the
probabilities of all worlds in which A is accepted, that is,
P (A) =
∑
ω∈2A,A∈ω P (ω). P (A) can be understood as a
degree of belief, where P (A) = 1 means complete accep-
tance and P (A) = 0 means complete rejection.
The meaning of attack and support relationships can be
defined by means of constraints in probabilistic epistemic
argumentation. For example, the Coherence postulate in
(Hunter and Thimm 2016) intuitively demands that the be-
lief in an argument is bounded from above by the belief of
its attackers. Formally, a probability function P respects
Coherence iff P (A) ≤ 1 − P (B) for all B ∈ Att(A). A
more general constraint language has recently been intro-
duced in (Hunter, Polberg, and Thimm 2018). Here, we will
restrict to a fragment of this language that allows solving
our reasoning problems in polynomial time (Potyka 2019).
A linear atomic constraint is an expression of the form
c0 +
n∑
i=1
ci · pi(Ai) ≤ d0 +
m∑
i=1
di · pi(Bi),
where Ai, Bi ∈ A, ci, di ∈ Q, n,m ≥ 0 (the sums can
be empty) and pi is a syntactic symbol that can be read as
’the probability of’. For example, the Coherence condition
above can be expressed by a linear atomic constraint with
m = n = 1, c0 = 0, c1 = 1, A1 = A, d0 = 1, d1 = −1 and
B1 = B. However, we can also define more complex con-
straints that take the beliefs of more than just two arguments
into account. Usually, the arguments that occur in a con-
straint are neighbors in the graph and the coefficients ci, di
will often be based on the weight of the edges between the
arguments. We will see many examples later.
A probability function P satisfies a linear atomic con-
straint iff c0 +
∑n
i=1 ci · P (Ai) ≤ d0 +
∑m
i=1 di · P (Bi).
P satisfies a set of linear atomic constraints C, denoted as
P |= C, iff it satisfies all constraints c ∈ C. If this is the
case, we call C satisfiable.
We are interested in two reasoning problems here that
have been introduced in (Hunter and Thimm 2016). First,
the satisfiability problem is, given a graph (A, E ,w) and a
set of constraints C over this graph, to decide if the con-
straints are satisfiable. This basically allows us to check that
our modelling assumptions are consistent. Second, the en-
tailment problem is, given a graph (A, E ,w), a set of satis-
fiable constraints C and an argument A, to compute lower
and upper bounds on the probability ofA based on the prob-
ability functions that satisfy the constraints. For example,
suppose we have A = {A,B,C}, E = {(A,B), (B,C)},
w((A,B)) = 1, w((B,C)) = −1. We encode the meaning
of the support relationship (A,B) by w((A,B)) · pi(A) ≤
pi(B) (a supporter bounds the belief in the argument from
below) and the meaning of the attack relationship (B,C)
by pi(C) ≤ 1 + w((B,C)) · P (B) (an attacker bounds the
belief in the argument from above). Say, we also tend to ac-
cept C and model this by the constraint 0.5 ≤ pi(C). Then
our constraints are satisfiable and the entailment results are
P (A) ∈ [0, 0.5], P (B) ∈ [0, 0.5], P (C) ∈ [0.5, 1]. To un-
derstand the reasoning, let us consider the upper bound for
A. If we had P (A) > 0.5, we would also have P (B) > 0.5
because of the support constraint. But then, we would have
P (C) < 0.5 because of the attack constraint. However, this
would violate our constraint for C. Hence, we must have
P (A) ≤ 0.5. In particular, if we would add the constraint
1 ≤ pi(A) (acceptA), our constraints would become unsatis-
fiable. Both the satisfiability and the entailment problem can
be automatically solved by linear programming techniques.
In general, the linear programs can become exponentially
large. However, both problems can be solved in polynomial
time when we restrict to linear atomic constraints (Potyka
2019).
3 Basic Legal Argumentation Framework
Legal reasoning problems can occur in many forms and an
attempt to capture all of them at once would most probably
result in a framework that is hardly more concrete than a
general abstract argumentation framework. We will there-
fore focus on a particular scenario, where the innocence
of a defendant has to be decided. Modeling a single case
may not be sufficient to illustrate the general applicability
of probabilistic epistemic argumentation. We will therefore
try to define a reasoning framework that can be instantiated
for different cases, while still being easily comprehensible.
As with every formal model, there are some simplifying as-
sumptions about the nature of a trial. However, we think that
our framework is sufficient to illustrate how real cases can be
modeled and structured by means of probabilistic epistemic
argumentation. We will make some additional comments
about this as we proceed.
Following (Fenton, Neil, and Lagnado 2013), we regard a
legal case roughly as a collection of hypotheses and pieces
of evidence that support the hypotheses. We model both as
Figure 1: Meta-Graph for our Legal Reasoning Framework.
abstract arguments, that is, as something that can be ac-
cepted or rejected to a certain degree by a legal decision
maker like a judge, the jury or a lawyer. To begin with,
we introduce three meta hypotheses that we model by three
arguments Einc (the defendant should be declared guilty
because of the inculpatory evidence), Eex (the defendant
should be declared innocent because of the exculpatory ev-
idence) and Innocence (the defendant is innocent). We re-
gard Innocence as the ultimate hypothesis that is to be de-
cided within the trial. In general, it may be necessary to
consider several ultimate hypotheses that may correspond
to different qualitative degrees of legal liability (e.g. intent
vs. accident vs. innocent). If necessary, these can be in-
corporated by adding additional ultimate hypotheses in an
analogous way. Einc and Eex are supposed to merge hy-
potheses and pieces of evidence that speak against (Einc) or
for (Eex) the defendant’s innocence as illustrated in Figure
1. Support relationships are indicated by a plus and attack
relationships by a minus sign. There can also be attack and
support relationships between pieces of evidence and addi-
tional hypotheses.
Intuitively, as our belief in Einc increases, our belief in
Innocence should decrease. As our belief in Eex increases,
our belief in Innocence should increase. From a classi-
cal perspective, accepting Einc, should result in rejecting
Innocence and accepting Eex, should result in accepting
Innocence. In particular, we should not accept Eex and Einc
at the same time. Of course, in general, both the inculpatory
evidence and the exculpatory evidence can be convincing to
a certain degree. Probabilities are one natural way to capture
this uncertainty. Intuitively, our basic framework is based on
the following assumptions that we will make precise in the
subsequent definition.
Inculpatory Evidence (IE): The belief in Innocence is
bounded from above by the belief in Einc.
Exculpatory Evidence (EE): The belief in Innocence is
bounded from below by the belief in Eex.
Supporting Evidence (SE): The belief in Einc and Eex is
bounded from below by the belief in their supporting
pieces of evidence.
Presumption of Innocence (PI): The belief in Innocence
is the maximum belief that is consistent with all assump-
tions.
The following definition gives a more formal description of
our framework. Our four main assumptions are formalized
in items 4 and 5.
Definition 1 (Basic Legal Argumentation Framework
(BLAF)). A BLAF is a quadruple (A, E ,w, C), where A
is a finite set of arguments, E is a finite set of directed edges
between the arguments, w : E → Q is a weighting function
and C is a set of linear atomic constraints over A such that:
1. A = AM unionmulti AS unionmulti AE is partitioned into a set of meta-
hypotheses AM = {Innocence,Einc,Eex}, a set of sub-
hypotheses AS and a set of pieces of evidence AE .
2. E = EM unionmulti ES unionmulti EE is partitioned into a set of meta edges
EM = {(Einc, Innocence), (Eex, Innocence)}, a set of
support edges ES ⊆ (AS ∪ AE) × {Einc,Eex} and a set
of evidential edges EE ⊆ (AS ∪ AE)× (AS ∪ AE).
3. w((Einc, Innocence)) = −1 and w((Eex, Innocence)) =
1. Furthermore, 0 ≤ w(e) ≤ 1 for all e ∈ ES
4. C contains at least the following constraints:
IE: pi(Innocence) ≤ 1+w((Einc, Innocence))·pi(Einc),
EE: w((Eex, Innocence)) · pi(Eex) ≤ pi(Innocence),
SE: w((E,H)) · pi(E) ≤ pi(H) for all (E,H) ∈ ES .
5. For all A ∈ A, we call B(A) = minP |=C P (A) the lower
belief in A and B(A) = maxP |=C P (A) the upper belief
in A. The belief in Innocence in is defined as
PI : B(Innocence) = B(A).
and the belief in the remaining A ∈ A \ {Innocence} is
the interval B(A) = [B(A),B(A)].
Items 1-3 basically give a more precise description of the
graph illustrated in Figure 1. Item 4 encodes our first three
main assumptions as linear atomic constraints. The general
form of our basic constraints is pi(B) ≤ 1 + w((A,B)) ·
P (A) for attack relations (A,B) (note that for w((A,B)) =
−1, this is just the coherence constraint from (Hunter and
Thimm 2016)) and w((A,B)) · pi(A) ≤ pi(B) for support
relations. Intuitively, attacker bound beliefs from above and
supporter bound beliefs from below. Item 5 defines lower
and upper beliefs in arguments as the minimal and maximal
probabilities that are consistent with our constraints. Fol-
lowing our fourth assumption (presumption of innocence),
the belief in Innocence is defined by the upper bound. The
beliefs in the remaining arguments is the interval defined by
the lower and upper bound. The following proposition sum-
marizes some consequences of our basic assumptions.
Proposition 1. For every BLAF (A, E ,w, C), we have
1. B(Einc) ≤ 1− B(Eex) and B(Eex) ≤ 1− B(Einc).
2. For all support edges (a,E) ∈ ES , we have
• B(Eex) ≤ 1− w((a,Einc)) · B(a) if E = Einc,
• B(Einc) ≤ 1− w((a,Eex)) · B(a) if E = Eex.
Proof. 1. We prove only the first statement, the second one
follows analogously. Consider an arbitrary P ∈ PA that sat-
isfies C. Then P (Einc) ≤ P (Innocence) ≤ 1 − P (Eex) ≤
1 − B(Eex). The first inequality follows from EE and the
second from IE (Def. 1, item 4) along with the conditions
Figure 2: BLAF for Example 1.
on w (Def. 1, item 3). The third inequality follows because
B(Eex) ≤ P (Eex) by definition of B.
2. Again, we prove only the first statement. Note that
SE (Def. 1, item 4) implies P (Einc) ≥ w((a,Einc)) · P (a)
for all P ∈ PA that satisfy C. Therefore, P (Eex) ≤ 1 −
P (Einc) ≤ 1−w((a,Einc))·P (a) ≤ 1−w((a,Einc))·B(a),
where the first and third inequalities can be derived like in
1.
Intuitively, item 1 says that our upper belief that the de-
fendant should be declared guilty because of the inculpatory
evidence is bounded from above by our lower belief that the
defendant should be declared innocent because of the ex-
culpatory evidence and vice versa. By rearranging the equa-
tions, we can see that the lower belief in Einc is also bounded
from above by the upper belief in Eex and vice versa. Item
2 explains that every argument a that directly contributes to
inculpatory (exculpatory) evidence E gives an upper bound
for the belief in Eex (Einc) that is based on our lower be-
lief B(a) and the relevance w((a,E)) of this argument. In
a similar way, we could bound the beliefs in contributors
to Einc by the belief in contributors to Eex by taking their
respective weights into account. However, the general de-
scription becomes more and more difficult to comprehend.
Therefore, we just illustrate the interactions by means of a
simple example.
Example 1. Let us consider a simple case of hit-and-run
driving. The defendant is accused of having struck a car
while parking at a shopping center. The plaintiff witnessed
the accident from afar and denoted the registration number
from the licence plate when the car left (T1). The defendant
denies the crime and testified that he was at home with his
girlfriend at the time of the offence (T2). His girlfriend con-
firmed his alibi (T3). However, a security camera at the park-
ing space recorded a person that bears strong resemblance to
the defendant at the time of the crime (E1). We consider a
simple formalization shown in Figure 2. We designed the
graph in a way that allows illustrating the interactions in our
framework. One may also want to regard T3 as a supporter
of exculpatory evidence and consider attack relationships
between E1 and T1 and T3. We do not introduce such edges
because we want to illustrate the indirect interactions be-
tween arguments. In this example, we may weigh all edges
with 1 and control the uncertainty only about the degrees
of belief. However, we assign a weight of 0.9 to the edge
from T1 in order to illustrate the effect of the weight. This
may capture the uncertainty that the plaintiff may have writ-
ten down the wrong registration number, for example. The
A B1 B2 B3
Innocence 1 1 0.1
Einc [0, 1] [0, 0.3] [0.9, 1]
Eex [0, 1] [0.7, 1] [0, 0.1]
T1 [0, 1] [0, 0.33] [0, 1]
T2 [0, 1] [0.7, 1] [0, 0.1]
T3 [0, 1] [0.7, 1] [0, 0.1]
E1 [0, 1] [0, 0.3] [0.9, 1]
Table 1: Beliefs under additional assumptions for Example 1
(rounded to two digits). Directly constrained beliefs are high-
lighted in bold.
probability for T1, T2 and T3 is our degree of belief that the
corresponding testimonies are true. The probability of E1 is
our degree of belief that the camera does indeed show the
defendant and not just another person. Without additional
assumptions, we can only derive that our degree of belief in
Innocence is 1 (presumption of innocence) as shown in the
second column (B1) of Table 1. We could now start adding
assumptions and looking at the consequences. For example,
let us assume that the statement of the defendant’s girlfriend
was very convincing. We could incorporate this by adding
the constraint pi(T3) ≥ 0.7. The consequences are shown in
the third column (B2) of Table 1. However, if the person on
the camera bears strong resemblance to the defendant, we
may find that the upper belief in E1 is too low. This means
that our assumption is too strong and needs to be revised.
Let us just delete the constraint pi(T3) ≥ 0.7 and instead im-
pose a constraint on E1. Let us assume that there is hardly
any doubt that the camera shows the defendant. We could
incorporate this by adding the constraint pi(E1) ≥ 0.9. The
consequences are shown in the fourth column (B3) of Table
1.
The choice of probabilities (degrees of belief), weights
(relevance) and additional attack or support relations is, of
course, subjective. However, arguably, every court decision
is subjective in that the decision maker(s) have to weigh the
plausibility and the relevance of the evidence in one way or
another. By making these assumptions explicit in a formal
framework, the decision process can become more transpar-
ent. Furthermore, by computing probabilities while adding
assumptions, possible inconsistencies can be detected and
resolved early. Since we restrict to linear atomic constraints,
computing probabilities can be done within a second even
when there are thousands of arguments.
Let us note that our framework also allows defining some
simple rules that allow deriving explanations for the verdict
automatically. For example, the belief in Innocence can be
explained directly from the beliefs in Einc and Eex. If both
B(Einc) ≤ 0.5 and B(Eex) ≤ 0.5. our system may report
that the defendant is found innocent because of lack of ev-
idence. If B(Eex) > 0.5, it could report that the defendant
is found innocent because the exculpatory evidence is more
plausible than the inculpatory evidence (recall from Propo-
sition 1 that B(Einc) ≤ 1 − B(Eex)). Finally, if B(Einc) is
sufficiently large, it could report that the defendant is found
guilty because of the inculpatory evidence. The belief in
Einc and Eex can then be further explained based on the be-
lief in supporting hypotheses and pieces of evidence. The
influence of supporting arguments can be measured by their
lower belief bounds and their weight. To illustrate this, con-
sider again Table 1. For B1, the system could report that
the defendant is innocent because of lack of convincing ev-
idence, while, for B2, it can explain that there is convincing
exculpatory evidence. If desired, it can then further report
T2 as the direct explanation and, going backwards, T3 as an
additional explanation. Similarly, for B3, the system could
report that the defendant is probably not innocent because
of the inculpatory evidence. Again, the system could give
further explanations by going backwards in the graph. We
will discuss the idea in more general form in Section 5.
4 Adding Additional Structure to BLAFs
BLAFs can capture a wide variety of cases. However, it
is often desirable to add additional structure that captures
recurring patterns in legal reasoning. From a usability per-
spective, this makes the graph more easily comprehensible
and allows modeling different cases in a consistent and stan-
dardized way. From an automated reasoning perspective, it
allows adding additional general rules that can automatically
derive explanations for decisions.
Two natural subsets of inculpatory evidence are direct
(Ed) and circumstantial (Ec) inculpatory evidence. While
direct evidence provides direct inculpatory evidence, cir-
cumstantial evidence involves indirect evidence that requires
multiple inferential steps (Fenton, Neil, and Lagnado 2013).
For example, a camera that recorded the defendant while
committing the crime can be seen as direct evidence, while a
camera that recorded the defendant close to the crime scene
like in Example 1 can be seen as a piece of circumstantial
evidence. Two prominent categories of circumstantial evi-
dence are motive (the defendant had a reason to commit the
crime) and opportunity (the defendant had the opportunity to
commit the crime). Figure 3 shows a refined BLAF. As indi-
cated by the join of their support edges, the beliefs in pieces
of circumstantial evidence are merged and not considered
independently. Only if both a motive and the opportunity
(and perhaps some additional conditions) were present, the
defendant should be found guilty. In contrast, pieces of di-
rect evidence are standalone arguments for the defendant’s
guilt.
Two recurring patterns of exculpatory evidence are alibi
and ability. While an alibi indicates that the defendant has
not been at the crime scene at the time of the crime, abil-
ity can contain pieces of evidence that indicate that the de-
fendant could not have committed the crime, for example,
due to lack of physical strength. Figure 3 shows an ex-
tended BLAF with six additional meta-hypotheses. As be-
fore, we allow edges between all pieces of evidence and sub-
hypotheses, but do not draw all possible direct connections
in order to keep the graph comprehensible. The meaning
of the support edges pointing to inculpatory and exculpa-
tory evidence is already defined by SE in Definition 1, item
4. That is the corresponding support relations (A,B) are
Figure 3: Refined BLAF with additional meta-hypotheses.
associated with the constraint w((A,B)) · pi(A) ≤ pi(B).
This constraint could also be naturally used for the eviden-
tial edges that point to direct evidence, alibi and ability.
However, the circumstantial evidence patterns motive and
opportunity should not act independently, but complement
each other. Neither a motive, nor the opportunity alone,
are a good reason to find the defendant guilty. However,
if both a good motive and the opportunity are present, this
may be a good reason. We say that both items together pro-
vide collective support for the guilt of the defendant. To
formalize collective support, we can consider a constraint
w((Motive,Ec)) · pi(Motive) + w((Opportunity,Ec)) ·
pi(Opportunity) ≤ pi(Ec) such that w((Motive,Ec)) +
w((Opportunity,Ec)) ≤ 1. For example, we could set
w((Motive,Ec)) = w((Opportunity,Ec)) = 0.4. Then
the presence of a strong motive or the opportunity alone can-
not decrease the belief in the defendant’s innocent by more
than 0.4 and both together cannot decrease the belief by
more than 0.8. Opportunity is indeed considered a necessary
requirement for the defendant’s guilt in the legal reasoning
literature and motive is, at least, widely accepted as such
(Fenton, Neil, and Lagnado 2013). Collective support is an
interesting pattern in general, so that we give a more gen-
eral definition here. Given arguments A1, . . . , An (pieces of
evidence or sub-hypotheses) that support another argument
B such that
∑n
i=1w((Ai, B)) ≤ 1, the collective support
constraint is defined as
CS:
∑n
i=1w((Ai, B)) · pi(Ai) ≤ pi(B).
The following example illustrates how the additional struc-
ture can be applied.
Example 2. Let us consider a simple robbery case. The de-
fendant D is accused of having robbed the victim V . The
extended BLAF is shown in Figure 4. Before the crime,
D and V met in a bar and had a fight about money that V
owed D. V testified that D threatened to get the money
one way or another (V1). D acknowledged the fight, but de-
nied the threat (D1). While D’s testimony still contains a
motive for the crime, it is now significantly weaker. This
can be reflected in the weights. We could consider a more
fine-grained view distinguishing the fight and the threat and
add an attack between the contradicting statements, but in
order to keep things simple, we refrain from doing so. V
testified that he got robbed at 23:30 by a masked person
Figure 4: Extended BLAF for Example 2.
and that he recognized the defendant based on his voice
and stature (V2). This can be seen as direct evidence for
the crime, but since the accused is of average stature, it
should have only a small weight. A waiter working at the
bar testified that the defendant left the bar at about 23:00
(W1). This may have allowed the defendant hypothetically
to commit the crime, but he could have went anywhere, so
the weight should be again low. The defendant testified
that he went to the movie theater and watched a movie that
started at 23:15 (D2). If true, this is a strong alibi and should
therefore have a large weight. An employee at the movie
theater testified that the defendant is a frequent guest and
that he recalled him buying a drink (E1). However, he did
not recall the exact time. So the alibi is somewhat weak
and should not have too much weight. We weigh Motive
and Opportunity equally with w((Motive, Innocence)) =
w((Opportunity, Innocence)) = 0.3. The influence of the
belief in motive and opportunity on circumstantial evidence
is defined by the collective support constraint that we de-
scribed above. All evidential edges (E,A) that originate
from a piece of evidenceE are associated with the constraint
w((E,A)) · pi(E) ≤ pi(A). Figure 4 shows the final graph
structure and edge weights.
Having defined the structure of the graph and the mean-
ing of the edges, we can start to assign beliefs to pieces of
evidence. Again, without making any assumptions about
the beliefs, we can only infer that the degree of belief in
Innocence is 1. This is shown in the second column of Ta-
ble 2. To begin with, we assume that the testimonies given
by the cinema employee and the waiter of the bar are true
(pi(E1) = 1, pi(W1) = 1). The third column of Table 2
shows the consequences of these assumptions. We can see,
for example, that the alibiE1 provides a lower bound for the
belief in the exculpatory evidence and thus an upper bound
for the beliefs in the inculpatory evidence and the related
hypotheses. It seems also safe to assume that the defen-
dant did not lie about his participation in the fight, so we
the constraint pi(D1) = 1 next. The fourth column in Ta-
ble 2 shows the resulting belief intervals. The new support
for motive adds to the support of the circumstantial evidence
and the lower bound on the belief in the inculpatory evidence
is raised. This lowers the belief in the innocence of the ac-
cused slightly. Note again that it also decreases the upper
bound on the belief in exculpatory evidence indirectly. Fi-
A Basic W1, E1 W1, E1,
D1
W1, E1,
D1, V 2
Innocence [0, 1] 0.94 0.91 0.8
Einc [0, 1] [0.06, 0.7] [0.09, 0.7] [0.2, 7]
Eex [0, 1] [0.3, 0.94] [0.3, 0.91] [0.3, 0.8]
Ec [0, 1] [0.06, 0.7] [0.09, 0.7] [0.09, 0.7]
Ed [0, 1] [0, 0.7] [0, 0.7] [0.2, 0.7]
Alibi [0, 1] [0.3, 0.94] [0.3, 0.91] [0.3, 0.8]
Ability [0, 1] [0, 0.94] [0, 0.91] [0, 0.8]
Motive [0, 1] [0, 1] [0.1, 1] [0.1, 1]
Opportunity [0, 1] [0.2, 1] [0.2, 1] [0.2, 1]
V 1 [0, 1] [0, 1] [0, 1] [0, 1]
V 2 [0, 1] [0, 1] [0, 1] 1
D1 [0, 1] [0, 1] 1 1
D2 [0, 1] [0.3, 1] [0.3, 1] [0.3, 0.89]
W1 [0, 1] 1 1 1
E1 [0, 1] 1 1 1
Table 2: Belief in Innocence and entailment results under addi-
tional assumptions for Example 2 (rounded to two digits). Directly
constrained beliefs are highlighted in bold.
nally, let us assume that the defendant does not lie about
having recognized the defendant (pi(V 2) = 1) (recall that
the uncertainty about the recognition reliability is incorpo-
rated in the edge weight). The fifth column in Table 2 shows
the new beliefs. We can see that the belief in the defendant’s
innocence decreases significantly. If we notice that a larger
or smaller change is more plausible, we could take account
of this by adapting the edge weight. In this way, legal cases
can be analyzed in a systematic way and the plausibility of
assumptions can be checked on the fly by looking at their
ramifications.
In addition to the previously introduced additional cate-
gories of meta-hypotheses, another recurring pattern in legal
cases are mutually dependent pieces of evidence. One way
to model this in our framework, is to define a meta-argument
that is influenced by the dependent pieces of evidence. The
collective support constraint CS is well suited to capture this
relationship accurately. We illustrate this with an example
from (Fenton, Neil, and Lagnado 2013, pp.82-84).
Example 3. Let us assume that a person was recorded
by two video cameras from different perspectives at a
crime scene. If the person is the defendant, the defen-
dant should resemble the person on both images. In the
BLAF, we can incorporate the two camera observations
as pieces of evidence Camera1,Camera2 supporting a
meta-hypothesis Camera that says that the defendant was
at the crime scene because of camera evidence. Note
that if we use the SE constraint for the evidential edges
from Camera1,Camera2, each of the two cameras would
independently determine a lower bound for Camera which
seems to strong in this example. Instead, we can use the
CS constraint that we already used to capture the relation-
ship between opportunity and motive. In this example,
the CS constraint becomes w((Camera1,Camera)) ·
pi(Camera1) + w((Camera2,Camera)) · pi(Camera2) ≤
pi(Camera), where w((Camera1,Camera)) +
w((Camera2,Camera)) ≤ 1. For example both cam-
era weights could be set to w((Camera1,Camera)) =
w((Camera2,Camera)) = 0.5 to give equal relevance
to both. Then, if the person resembles the defendant only
from one perspective, say we have pi(Camera1) = 1 and
pi(Camera2) = 0, the induced lower bound on the belief
in Camera will be only 0.5. Only if the belief in both
cameras is larger than 0.5, the lower bound can be larger
than 0.5. For example, if we have pi(Camera1) = 0.7 and
pi(Camera2) = 0.9, the induced lower bound is 0.8.
5 Automated Explanation Generation
As we already illustrated at the end of Section 3, the struc-
ture of our framework allows generating explanations for
decisions automatically. In general, explaining the meta-
hypotheses Innocence,Einc and Eex is easier than explain-
ing the beliefs in other arguments because of their restricted
form.
Note first that the only direct neighbors of Innocence are
Einc and Eex and we know that Einc is an attacker and Eex
is a supporter. Therefore, we can basically distinguish three
cases that we already described at the end of Section 3.
1. B(Einc) ≤ T and B(Eex) ≤ 0.5: The defendant is found
innocent due to lack of evidence.
2. B(Eex) > 0.5: the defendant is found innocent because
the exculpatory evidence is more plausible than the incul-
patory evidence.
3. B(Einc) > T : the defendant is found guilty because of
the inculpatory evidence.
Here, T is a threshold that should usually be chosen from
the open interval (0.5, 1). 0.5 is sometimes regarded as the
acceptance threshold, but in a legal setting, it may be more
appropriate to choose a larger threshold like T = 0.75.
After having received a high-level explanation of the ver-
dict, the user may be interested in more details and ask
for reasons that explain the plausibility of inculpatory or
exculpatory evidence. Explaining Einc and Eex is more
complicated already because we have an unknown number
of neighbors in the graph now. However, the only neigh-
bors can be supporters (parents) and Innocence (child). By
Definition 1, item 4, their meaning is encoded by the SE-
constraint. Assuming that the user did not add additional
constraints about the relationships between Einc, Eex and
Innocence, we can again define some simple rules. If addi-
tional constraints on Einc and Eex are desirable, these rules
may need to be refined, of course. Otherwise, we can dis-
tinguish two cases. If the user asks for an explanation for
the lower belief, we can reason as follows: a non-trivial
lower bound (> 0) can only result from a supporter with
non-trivial lower bound. So in this case, we can go through
the supporters, collect those supporters that induce the max-
imum lower bound and report them as an explanation.
The user may also ask for an explanation for the upper
belief. A non-trivial upper bound (< 1) can only result from
a non-trivial bound on the belief in Innocence. Let us as-
sume that we want to explain a non-trivial upper bound on
Einc. From the IE-constraint in Definition 1, item 4, we can
see that this must be caused by a non-trivial lower bound on
Innocence. This lower bound, in turn, must be caused by
a non-trivial lower bound on Eex by our assumptions. We
could now report the lower bound on Eex as an explana-
tion. A more meaningful explanation would be obtained by
also explaining the lower bound on Eex. This can be done
as explained before by looking at the supporters of Eex. A
non-trivial upper bound on Eex can be explained in a sym-
metrical manner.
Generating automatic explanations for the remaining sub-
hypotheses and pieces of evidence is most challenging, but
can be done as long as we can make assumptions about the
constraints that are involved. For example, often the SE-
constraint gives a natural meaning to support edges and the
weighted Coherence constraint gives a natural meaning to
attack edges. Intuitively, they cause a lower/upper bound on
the belief in an argument based on their own lower belief.
If these are the only constraints that are employed, explana-
tions for lower bounds can again be generated by collecting
the supporters that induce the largest lower bound. For ex-
plaining the upper bound, we now have to consider two fac-
tors. The first factor are attackers with a non-trivial lower
bound. The second factor are other arguments that are sup-
ported and have a non-trivial upper bound (then a too large
belief in the supporting argument would cause an inconsis-
tency). Therefore, we do not only collect the attacking ar-
guments that induce the largest lower bound, but we also
collect supported arguments. We can order the supported
arguments by their upper belief multiplied by the weight of
the support edge. If the smallest upper bound from the sup-
ported arguments is U and the largest lower bound from the
attacking arguments is L, we report the collected supported
arguments as an explanation if 1 − U > L, the collected
attacking arguments as an explanation if 1− U < L or both
if it happens that 1− U = L.
For additional constraints, we may have to refine these
rules again. One important constraint that we discussed is
the CS-constraint. In this case, we have to to treat the sup-
porters involved in this constraint differently since they all
contribute to the induced lower bound. When collecting
supporters for explaining lower bounds (the supporters are
parents), supporting edges that belong to one CS-constraint
have to be considered jointly and not independently. If they
induce a lower bound that is larger than all lower bounds
caused by an SE-constraint, they can be reported collectively
as an explanation. When collecting supporters for explain-
ing upper bounds (the supporters are children), the reason-
ing becomes more complicated because there can be various
interactions between the beliefs in the involved arguments.
We leave an analysis of this case and more general cases for
future work.
6 Related Work
Our legal reasoning framework allows explicit formalization
of uncertainty in legal decision making. Other knowledge
representation and reasoning formalisms have been applied
for this purpose. Studies of different game-theoretical tools
can be found in (Prakken and Sartor 1996; Riveret et al.
2007; Roth et al. 2007). (Dung and Thang 2010) proposed
a probabilistic argumentation framework where the beliefs
of different jurors are represented by individual probability
spaces. Intuitively, the jurors weigh the evidence and de-
cisions can be made based on criteria like majority voting
or belief thresholds. One particularly popular approach for
probabilistic legal reasoning are Bayesian networks. (Fen-
ton, Neil, and Lagnado 2013) provide a set of idioms used
for the construction of Bayesian networks based on legal ar-
gument patterns and apply and discuss their framework for
a specific case in (Fenton et al. 2019). (Timmer et al. 2017)
developed an algorithm to extract argumentative informa-
tion from a Bayesian network with an intermediate struc-
ture, a support graph and analyze their approach in a legal
case study. (Vlek et al. 2016) propose a method to model
different scenarios about crimes with Bayesian networks us-
ing scenario scheme idioms and to extract information about
the scenario and the quality of the scenario.
Determining the weights and beliefs for the edges and
items of evidence poses a problem for our framework as
well as for other symbolic approaches. For some items
of evidence the weights as well as the probabilities can
be elicited based on statistical analysis and forensic evi-
dence (Kwan et al. 2011; Fenton and Neil 2012; Zhang
and Thai 2016). To test the robustness of Bayesian net-
works with respect to minor changes in subjective beliefs,
(Fenton, Neil, and Lagnado 2013) propose to apply sen-
sitivity analysis on the nodes in question. In our frame-
work, the impact of subjective beliefs can be analysed in
a similar manner, by altering the beliefs which are asso-
ciated with the evidence or the weights associated with
the edges. The automated explanation generation outlined
in Section 5 can then provide information about the in-
fluence that differing beliefs have on hypotheses and sub-
hypotheses in the framework. With this the perspective of
different agents can be modeled, for example the defense
and prosecution perspectives. The clear structure of argu-
mentation frameworks is well suited for generating explana-
tions automatically and related explanation ideas have been
considered recently in (Cocarascu, Rago, and Toni 2019;
Cˇyras et al. 2019; Zeng et al. 2018), for example.
In Bayesian networks, inconsistency is usually not an is-
sue because of the way how they are defined. In contrast,
in our framework, inconsistencies can easily occur. For ex-
ample, if a forensic expert judges both the accuracy of an
alibi and the relevance of a direct piece of evidence with
1, our constraints become inconsistent. While this may be
inconvenient, this inconsistency is arguably desirable. This
is because the modeling assumptions are inconsistent and
this should be recognized and reported by the system. If
automated merging of the inconsistent beliefs is desirable,
this can be achieved by different tools. One possibility is to
apply inconsistency measures for probabilistic logics in or-
der to evaluate the severity of conflicts (De Bona and Finger
2015; Potyka 2014; Thimm 2013). In order to determine the
sources of the inconsistency and their impact, Shapley val-
ues can be applied (Hunter and Konieczny 2010). Alterna-
tively, we could replace our exact probabilistic reasoning al-
gorithms with inconsistency-tolerant reasoning approaches
that resolve inconsistencies by minimizing conflicts (Adam-
cik 2014; Muin˜o 2011; Potyka and Thimm 2015) or based
on priorities (Potyka 2015). This would be more convenient
for the knowledge engineer, but the resulting meaning of the
probabilities becomes less clear.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We proposed a probabilistic abstract argumentation frame-
work for automated reasoning in law based on probabilistic
epistemic argumentation (Hunter and Thimm 2016; Hunter,
Polberg, and Thimm 2018). Our framework is best suited for
merging beliefs in pieces of evidence and sub-hypotheses.
Computing an initial degree of belief for particular pieces
of evidence based on forensic evidence can often be better
accomplished by applying Bayesian networks or a conven-
tional statistical analysis. Our framework can then be ap-
plied on top in order to merge the different beliefs in pieces
of evidence and subhypotheses in a transparent and explain-
able way. In particular, point probabilities are not required,
but imprecise probabilities in the form of belief intervals are
supported as well.
It is also interesting to note that the worst-case runtime of
our framework is polynomial (Potyka 2019). Bayesian net-
works also have polynomial runtime guarantees in some spe-
cial cases, for example, when the Bayesian network struc-
ture is a polytree (i.e., it does not contain cycles when ignor-
ing the direction of the edges). The polynomial runtime in
probabilistic epistemic argumentation is guaranteed by re-
stricting to a fragment of the full language. This fragment
is sufficient for many cases and is all that we used in this
work. However, sometimes it may be necessary to extend
the language. For example, instead of talking only about the
probabilities of single pieces of evidence and subhypothe-
ses, we may want to talk about the probabilities of logical
combinations. Similarly, one may want to merge beliefs not
only in a linear, but in a non-linear way. Both extensions are
difficult to deal with, in general. However, it seems worth-
while to study such cases in more detail in order to identify
some other tractable special cases.
Another interesting aspect for future work is extending
the automated support tools for designing and querying our
legal argumentation frameworks. As explained in Section
5, the basic framework can be explained well automati-
cally. However, when beliefs are merged in more compli-
cated ways like by the collective support constraint, a deeper
analysis is required. We will study explanation generation
for collective support and other interesting merging patterns
in more detail in future work. For the design of the frame-
work, it may also be helpful to generate explanations for the
sources of inconsistency. As explained in the related work
section, a combination of inconsistency measures for prob-
abilistic logics and Shapley values seems like a promising
approach that we will study. It is also interesting to apply
different approaches for inconsistency-tolerant reasoning in
order to avoid inconsistencies altogether. However, while
these approaches usually can give some meaningful analyt-
ical guarantees, it is important to study empirically if these
guarantees are sufficient in order to guarantee meaningful
results in legal or other applications.
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